The Necessity to Reform Supreme Security Council of the Republic of Moldova »»» 

The Necessity to Reform Supreme Security Council of the Republic of Moldova

Sep 2009

Valeriu Mija, PRISA Executive Director

I. General Aspects

This year public disorder events on April 7 in the Republic of Moldova has acutely revealed imperfection of the legal basis of the national security sector and absence of juridical mechanisms that support its functionality – the fact that contains a serious risk for the national security system.

In the current state of affairs the governance of the Republic of Moldova - being a parliamentarian form - has been being executed by a large coalition. Such situations may potentially create real conditions for appearance of an executive dualism over a security sector and, consequently, a major threat to stagnate and to block such national segment. As a result, appearance of such circumstances might negatively affect a national security. Such scenario in the case of the Republic of Moldova will limit the decision-making power of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces – the President of Moldova, who is the guarantee of sovereignty, national independence and state integrity.

Presently, to execute constitution obligations and, specifically, to manage security sector, the President of Moldova is assisted by the Supreme Security Council (SSC) composed of a permanent secretariat and Council members with virtual status having a right of vote, who also represent the executive branch and the Parliament. According to evaluations and conclusions of many national security experts, the Supreme Security Council in the current form, which should have essentially been the national security sector principle institution, has proved to be an inefficient and inert one. Furthermore, it is risking developing into a decorative state institution within the national decision making. One of principal reasons of such conclusion is the fact that members of the SSC will always tend to reflect their parties’ positions at governance. Such phenomenon might hypothetically create a conflict of interest and eventually lead to a deadlock regarding important decisions in this sector. Consequently, weak and inefficient SSC roles in a parliamentarian governance form will lead to an absolute transfer of the decision power toward Government, which holds the major executive power and, respectively, necessary finances and recourses. As a result, in the present political system a chairman of the party that obtains a victory in a national election campaign, being elected as a Prim-minister, has all possibilities to concentrate the national power through total control over security sector. The experience of the last governance clearly demonstrated this phenomenon. Also, as an eloquent example of the conflict of interest might serve the conflict from 1996, when the Prim-minister, Andrei Sangheli, and the Minister of Defense, Division General Pavel Creanga, in the period of 15-17 March 1996 experience a temptation to employ the National Army in the interest of Parliament majority, entering into direct contradiction with the President of the Republic, Mircea Snegur - Commander in Chief from the respective period of time.

Overall, the tragic events of April 07, 2009 at the Moldovan Parliament and stagnation of implementation of democratic reforms in the national security sector and Individual Partnership Action Plan RM-NATO integrally proved the inefficiency of the national security system of the Republic of Moldova, especially of the SSC. It is not a big secret that phenomenon very badly affected the image of the Republic of Moldova at the internal and external arena. Especially, that was noticed in the framework of the European integration process – the fact expressed by not signing of a new cooperation treaty between the Republic of Moldova and the European Union, scheduled for 2008-2009. One of the major reasons of the failure of democratic reforms in the security sector as well as the unsatisfactory performance of that segment has been the imperfection of the legal and normative basis. Such factor, at its turn, contributes to the dysfunction of the hierarchic-functional center of gravity (SSC) of the national security system that should periodically submit the President (Supreme Commander of Armed Forces) concepts, strategies and proposals elaborated and coordinated top-down across the entire spectrum of security sector. Only in such type of approach, along with military security, the national security mechanism will comprehensively cover all national security segments: economic, energy, ecological, constitutional, demographic, migration and not at the last turn the ideological and informational.

In the opinion of not only international but also national experts, the SSC in the current model, with respective attributions, has not become a national institution, which would generate ideas, concepts and security policies and furthermore would coordinate national security aspects. Due to that reason the security sector in the R. Moldova, having as a composition the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Information Security Service, State Protection Service, Border Guard Service, Customs Service, Center for Combating Economic Crimes and Corruption, became a deeply-decentralized model, where each institution planned and implemented its own policy based on corporative interest and not on clearly-defined national one. In fact, the current national security system has proved to have lack of transparency, inefficient democratic control, and unjustified financial expenditures as well as ineffectiveness in crises management situations. Moreover, the existence of a possibility of marginalization of the role of President of the RM – the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces will potentially affect the Moldovan political system and transdniestrian conflict- resolution process.

For the purpose of optimization and perfection of the national security system according to democratic standards, the article recommends as a priority modification of structure, composition and disposition as well as functional attributions of the Supreme Security Council in accordance with standards and best practices of democratic states. Only such approach toward this reform will increase the authority and role of the Supreme Security Council in the society and the national political system.

II. Comparative International Analysis

International security evolution in the age of growing globalization has proved that national security aspects have become more complex and as one of the main priorities for stable nation state development, not limited only to a conventional state defense and combating espionage. The tragic events of September 11, 2001 in the US, last year global financial and economic crisis, escalation of ideological and religious confrontations, global illegal migrations, separatists conflicts, as in case of transdniestrian one, have demonstrated the complexity of international and national security agendas. In that regards, roles of national security institutions become more important and large one.

Generally, experiences of many democratic national states affirm that a President, as a head of state, being responsible for a state sovereignty, overall manage a national security system. Meanwhile, to effectively manage that system, specifically, to formulate consolidated policies in a national security field, it is important that all national security institutions’ contributions and activities be coordinated, systematized, analyzed, along with policies’ implementation, monitored by an adequately-competent and professional National Security Council (NSC), which determines the nature of national security policies. In another words, strong states have strong security systems with an efficient and effective National Security Council with stipulated status in the national legislation.

According to a comparative analysis and systematization of national security systems of other states, three forms of the National Security Council appear to be widespread.

A first form presumes that a NSC is composed of national security advisers of the head of states: members of executive cabinet or head of state’s administration. It is a major forum that examines foreign and security policies’ issues; meanwhile, it is a national instrument, which guides the implementation of head of state’s decisions and policies in national security institutions.

As an example of such form of organization, the National Security Council of the United States of America, being an interdependent coordination tool, appear to be a cost-effective performant one – being proved by the history.[i] The US NSC, composed of executive members subordinated to the Head of State, is managed by the Principal Adviser of the President for National Security. The NSC is the efficient and effective one since its permanent members do not have a conflict of interest to block the process of policy development and implementation in the security field due to fact of being advisers of the President - executive power. Evidently, the entire power at the final stage of decision making in the security sector pertains to the US President, who is being constraint and balanced by the legislation power.

A second form presumes that a group of high-ranking officials of the national executive is employed as a tool, which develops and implements policies and will of a head of state in a security field. The experience of the Russian Federation is also a widespread alternative for the process of a national security decision approval.[ii] This model expects that a NSC consist of two distinctive categories (a model similar to the UN Security Council): permanent – with right to vote and virtual – with recommendatory functions. However, such institutional building of the NSC might generate a potential conflict of interest among NSC members; and, moreover, it appears more as a national decorative apparatus to demonstrate a legitimacy of presidential decisions. Meantime, participation at the NSC of members of the government cabinet with decision votes, being directly subordinated to the Prim-minister, might potentially create a conflict of interest within a process of national security policies’ development and implementation, if a President and a Prim-minister starts having big disagreements. Additionally, worthless to mention that this particular model proved to be an inefficient one in national crisis situations due to the motive of being a massive and inert one (the case of wars in the Chechen Republic [Russian Federation] in 1994, 1999 and in Georgia in 2008).

A third form, which also exists in many states of the CIS and EU[iii], presumes that a group of branch specialized experts from national security institutions, guided by a National Security Bureau of the President, is employed as a tool to analyze and elaborate recommendations regarding national security aspects for the head of state. Such model also expects existence of a Governmental Board, which would coordinate interaction of all security sector institutions and, along with the Presidential National Security Bureau, periodically present the head of state necessary analysis and recommendations. That model has demonstrated to be an inefficient one due to the reason of having dualism and conflict of interest among the NSC, the Presidential National Security Bureau and the Governmental Board of a Prim-minister. Besides, such model correspondently implies double financial expenditure.

III. The Analysis of the Supreme Security Council of the Republic of Moldova

In democratic states, a head of state, sometimes chief of executive, (annex 1) determines threats and risks for the national security. Accordingly, he/she approved the fundamental policies and strategic documents in the national security field, which become key elements in the national security planning and specifically as necessary capabilities for combating defined national security threats and managing potential risks. This aspect is very important one to mention since it determines basic elements of each institution of a national security sector and specifically: structure, composition, disposition, personnel limit, tasks and methods of execution and most important budget and necessary recourses. In another words, such approach defines the classical method of ways, means and ends in combating national security threats. Comparative analysis of the SSC of the RM revealed that present structure is the hybrid of second and third models - being considered by many experts as a weak, decorative and inefficient one.

In this regard, last year major events in the Moldovan national security sector additionally supported a common conclusion that the SSC of the RM has transformed into decorative institutions with very limited access to the national decision-making process; furthermore, absence of an adequate legal basis of the Council has also contributed to the inefficiency of its activity. The fact that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration (MFA EI – national diplomatic institution) assumed the leading agency role instead of the SSC for implementing national security and defense reforms: elaboration of the National Security Concept and implementation of the Individual Partnership Action Plan RM – NATO (IPAP) revealed the incapacity of the SSC in such institutional model to meet the demand of being the national coordinator of the Moldovan national security. Above-mentioned considerations and arguments imperatively recommend reformation of the SCC as one of the first priority of the national security sector reform.

IV. Recommendations for Reforming the SSC of the RM

For the purpose of creating a consultative – coordinative national security institution for the President of the RM – the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, the feasible model of the Supreme Security Council of the RM is proposed (annex 2). Managed by the President of the RM, this model represents to be an apparatus, which has a permanent structure with coordinative functions and a virtual one with recommendatory functions.

As a matter of fact, the proposed model asserts that in order to ensure national consensus, the President of the RM is consulted by the Inter-ministerial Committee, which is a part of the SSC, with function to submit recommendations regarding national security issues. Evidently, this SSC Committee has a composition of all key figures of the governance of the RM that have attributions to the national security field.

Meanwhile, in such model, it is very vital that President be assisted by a permanent structure with coordinative functions – the Executive Office of the SSC, which might simultaneously be a part of the administrative office of the President of the RM. Also, it is necessary that the Executive Office be managed by a Director, who should be the Principal Adviser of the President for the National Security. This analysis and recommendation argues that only in such approach the President of the RM will objectively hold the power of control over the process of development and coordination of national security policies.

Newly-proposed system of the SSC implies two forms of functional activities: first – consultation and recommendation, which pertains to the Inter-ministerial Committee, and second – coordination and control of implementation of approved decisions, which pertains to the Executive Office of the SSC. The second one is an important one, which is completely absent in the current SSC. Composed of specialized advisers in the fields such as foreign policy, defense, constitutional security and secret services, energy security, the Executive Office of the SSC will systematize, analyze and present recommendations to the Chairman of the SSC (President of the RM) for approval, which would be complexly and objectively evaluated and coordinated without conflict of interest in the process of competing for necessary recourses.

Proposed model also entails that the activity of the Executive Office would be complimented, case by case, by a scientific expertise committee, which would systematize all analysis of the international security environment and other aspects of the national security. This Committee would include the Moldovan Academy of Science, national scientific institutions, non-governmental organizations, and independent experts specialized in international and national security domains. Such approach would broadly involve Moldovan civil society and academics in interaction with the national security sector and will create an independent opinion source. This Committee might be created by a Decree of the President of the RM.

Obviously, the decisions of the SSC are approved by the President of the RM, the Chairman of the Council, who analyze more visions not only of the Inter-ministerial Committee in National Security – Government and Parliament opinions but also of the Executive Office of the SSC, which will directly and impartially analyze particular information. From technical point of view, reformation of the SSC of the RM according the proposed model will create a national security pyramid; at the top of this, the President of the SSC will guide national security system by conducting and coordinating a Strategic Security Review and a Strategic Defense Review with consequent development of strategic documents and policies, which regulate normative and legal basis of the national security sector.

The proposed model will in practice systematize and optimize the elements of recommendation and coordination of the national security sector and will not require additional expenditures in the current conditions of the RM.

V. Conclusion and recommendations

Reformation of the Supreme Security Council of the RM - key element of the national security system - should be among the highest national priorities. Such step will send a message to the EU and Euro-Atlantic Partners’ states that the Republic of Moldova is a credible partner capable to honor assumed commitments and obligations to democratize the national governance, especially to implement Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), which was officially re-launched in the RM at the end of 2009. Delay in reforming this institution might undermine the process of security and defense reforms and lead them in absolutely wrong directions.

In order to make the Supreme Security Council be more effective, it is decisive to establish, as a principle, several forms of activities of the Council - consultative-recommendatory one and coordinative-control one – the last one is absent in the present SSC.

Meanwhile, to practically allow an adequate employment of these activity forms, the adjustment of the SSC structure is proposed by configuration of the Council permanent and virtual segments: forming the Inter-ministerial Committee for the National Security (recommendatory function) and the Executive Office of the Council (coordinative function).

In the framework of reformation process of the Supreme Security Council, for political adjustment and simplification of the international perception of the RM security system, this analysis recommends to re-name the Supreme Security Council of the Republic of Moldova – a legacy soviet name (Âåðõîâíûé/Âûñøèé Ñîâåò Áåçîïàñíîñòè) – in the National Security Council. Such conception, which is wider-spread in many democratic states, reflects a more democratic and popular name without underlining superlative hierarchical subordination. This small gesture will bear a strong political message.

As a priority, adaptation of the new legal basis for the Supreme Security Council is required, and specifically:

- To adopt a Law on National Security Council (NSC), which would stipulate the role, attributions, functions and internal organization of the NSC according to the proposed structure in the Annex 2 (without technical details, which will be stipulated in a Presidential Decree);

- To introduce amendments in the NSC Chapter of the Law (project) on National Security Strategy that is supposed to establish tasks for the national security sector.

Having into consideration that according to many international best practices, the Supreme Security Council should become the functional-hierarchical center of gravity of the national security system, reformation of this institution only in accordance with such practices will more rapidly bring success to integral process of the national security sector reform in accordance with democratic standards.

 

   Annex:  

1. Principle and Hierarchy of a National Security Planning System [pdf.file] 

2. Proposed Structure of the National Security Council (NSC) of the RM [pdf.file]

 

 

©Valeriu Mija / PRISA Foundation, Sep' 2009